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WEST VIGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-BULDER'S EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO SECURE ARM-
TECT'S APPRovL.-In a recent case in which a building contractor
had fully performed his duty, there was evidence tending to show
that the architect in charge of the work, whose decision was made
final by the contract, arbitrarily or capriciously refused his ap-
proval. Held, that a jury is justified in setting aside or ignoring
the architect's decision. Berry v. Huntington Masonic Associa-
tion, 93 S. E. 355 (W. Va. 1917).
The court in this ease has overruled or modified the law as
stated in previous decisions in this state. Heretofore the cases
have shown a decided tendency to apply the strict common-law rule
as to the performance of express conditions precedent to building
and construction contracts which make the approval of the archi-
tect or engineer in charge a condition precedent to the payment
of the contractor. Plumbing Go. v. Carr, 54 W. Va. 272, 46 S. E.
458 (1903); Charleston Lumber Co. v. Friedman, 64 W. Va. 151,
166, 61 S. E. 815 (1908) ; Barrett v. Coal Co., 51 W. Va. 416, 41
S. B. 220 (1902). At common law the failure to show the approval of
the architect or engineer in such a case would be excused only by
showing that such approval was refused because of collusion with
the owner. Clark v. Watson, 18 C. B. N. S. 278; Batterbury v. Vyse,
2 H. & C. 42. American courts have shown a tendency to relax the
old common-law rule and in a majority of jurisdictions proof of the
approval of the architect or engineer will be excused by showing
such approval has been withheld arbitrarily, capriciously or
through mistake. Bradner v. Roffsell, 57 N. J. L. 32, 29 Atl. 317
(1894); Bentley v. Davidson, 74 Wis. 421, 43 N. W. 139 (1889).
Some cases have taken the extreme view that proof that the con-
tract has been substantially performed is evidence from which the
jury may find the approval of the architect or engineer has been
improperly withheld. If so, proof of such approval is excused.
Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648 (1882) ; MacKnight Flintic Stone
Co. v. New York, 160 N. Y. 72, 54 N. E. 661 (1899) ; Bird v. St.
John's Episcopal Church, 154 Ind. 138, 56 N. E. 129 (1900). This
extreme view has the effect of substituting the verdict of a jury
for the approval of the expert chosen by the owner to see that the
contract is properly performed. On the other hand, the old com-
mon-law'rule is unjust to the contractor because it may permit the
architect or engineer to defeat the contractor's honest claim and
cause the latter to lose the product of his labor and materials
which has become a part of the land. While the rule adopted in
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the principal case may be difficult to support on time-honored
principles of the law of contracts, it is to be commended because
it mitigates the harshness of the strict common-law rule and at
the same time sufficiently protects the owner by giving him the
benefit of the honest judgment of his architect or engineer.
MmINES AND MINING--CONSTRUCTION OF OIL AND GAS LEAsE-
WHAT IS A GAS WELL.-In an action for gas rental on a lease pro-
viding for a royalty of one eighth of the oil and $300 per annum
for "each and every gas well," it appeared that a well produced
both oil and gas. The evidence tended to show that the well had
a very strong rock pressure and a capacity of about one million
feet of gas per day, but that the gas could not be marketed profit-
ably by the lessee. Held, that the well was a "gas well" within the
meaning of the lease. Prichard v. Freeland Oil Co., 93 S. E. 871
(W. Va. 1917).
When this case was previously before the Supreme Court,
Prichard v. Freeland Oil Co., 75 W. Va. 450, 84 S. E. 495 (1914),
the court decided that the term "gas well" in this lease meant a
well from which, considering its location with reference to any
market for gas and its capacity as a gas producer, the lessee, by
reasonable effort, could market or use the gas with reasonable
profit. The judgment entered for the plaintiff in the trial court
was reversed on the ground that the evidence failed to show that
the well in question produced gas in such quantity that it could
be marketed with profit by the lessee. Although the evidence
tended, in the principal case, to show that the lessee could not
market the gas from this well with profit, yet the court held that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment for the plain-
tiff. Thus the court as to the same lease has materially modified
its former holding as to the meaning of the term "gas well" by
disregarding proof of the lessee's inability to dispose of the gas
at a profit. In other words, the idea of the court now seems to
be that "gas well' means such a well as operators of oil and gas
wells in the neighborhood would consider a gas well. This appears
to be a more reasonable construction, and more in conformity with
the probable intent of the parties, than the construction placed
upon the term in the former case. Under the construction put
upon the lease in the former case, a well could not be a gas well,
no matter how productive, unless its product could be profitably
utilized by the lessee. The holding in the principal case, that the
lessee may be liable for both the oil royalty and the gas rental from
the same well, is in accord with decisions in other jurisdictions.
Mathes v. Shaw Oil Co., 80 Kan. 181, 101 Pac. 998 (1909) ; Indiana
Natural Gas and Oil Co. v. Wilhelm, 44 Ind. App. 100, 86 N. E.
86 (1908); Pittsburg-Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Broyles, 46 Ind.
App. 3, 91 N. E. 754 (1910).
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